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Counterfactuals, History and Fiction 
Richard Ned Lebow ∗ 
Abstract: »Kontrafaktische Annahmen, Geschichte und Fiktion«. Counterfac-
tuals help us recognize the contingent nature of many political outcomes, probe 
the causes and contingency of these outcomes and evaluate them by imagining 
other outcomes and their consequences. Most importantly, counterfactuals 
have the potential to make us aware of the extent to which our deepest held as-
sumptions about how the world works are themselves the result of inferences 
drawn from contingent outcomes. This recognition can help us step outside of 
our world and view it from perspectives. 
Keywords: counterfactuals, contingency, evaluation, theory, testing, World 
War I. 
 
From Max Weber on, good social scientists have recognized that any regulari-
ties in behavior must be understood in terms of their cultural setting and endure 
only as long as it remains stable and the regularities themselves go unrecog-
nized by relevant actors. At best, the social world can be described in terms of 
punctuated equilibria. Regularities exist within bounded social domains, but 
those domains are often subject to sharp discontinuities that can change the 
pattern of practices, how they are understood or even the ends which they seem 
to serve. The search for regularities needs to be complemented by the investi-
gation of ruptures, sometimes caused by changes in both ideational and mate-
rial conditions, that undermine existing regularities and the understandings of 
actors on which they are often based. Counterfactual analysis is particularly 
suited to this task because it allows us to explore the workings and conse-
quences of non-linear interactions in open-ended systems in ways many other 
methods do not.  
My research speaks to historians because they have an equal interest in cau-
sation and increasingly understand that if we say x caused y, we assume, ce-
teris paribus, that “y” would not have occurred in the absence of “x.” As we 
cannot rerun the tape of history, we must, of necessity, use counterfactuals to 
probe causation. Counterfactuals speak to historians in a second important way. 
They can often be used to demonstrate the contingency of important events like 
the origins World War I that are critical for our understanding of the past By 
recognizing the contingency of World War I, and of other critical twentieth 
century events that followed from it, we become aware of the extent to which 
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our most fundamental assumptions about how the political world works are 
themselves contingent. Counterfactual thought experiments provide a vantage 
point for taking ourselves outside of our world and our assumptions about it 
where they can be subjected to active and open interrogation. Such an exercise 
not only drags into the open assumptions that are so deeply ingrained that they 
are taken for granted, but facilitates imaginative leaps in historical understand-
ing.  
World War I was the dominant international event of the twentieth century. 
It hastened the ascendancy of the United States as the world’s leading eco-
nomic power, led to the breakup of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian 
and Ottoman empires and set in motion a chain of events that ultimately led to 
the demise of the British, French, Spanish and Portuguese empires as well. The 
War decimated a generation of young men and killed millions of civilians made 
vulnerable to influenza and other pathogens by the ravages of war, dislocation, 
ethnic cleansing and allied blockade. It triggered a revolution in Russia, which 
had echoes in eastern and central Europe and more lasting resonance in China 
and Southeast Asia. Collectively, these developments made it almost impossi-
ble to restore political and economic stability to Europe, helping to pave the 
way for Hitler’s rise to power, the Holocaust and a second, far more deadly, bid 
for hegemony by Germany in alliance with Italy and Japan. World War II in 
turn gave rise to a Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the West that kept 
Europe divided for fifty years and the target of thousands of nuclear weapons 
that at the push of a button could have turned the continent into a desolate, 
uninhabitable no-man’s land. 
World War I and the events that followed had equally profound cultural and 
intellectual consequences. Europe’s self-confidence was lost along with its 
leading role in the world, encouraging forms of artistic expression that commu-
nicated defiance, doubt, confusion and alienation. Many artists and intellectuals 
sought refuge in a highly idealized image of Soviet-style socialism. Europe’s 
internecine struggles and exhaustion after World War II dramatically acceler-
ated the hegemony of the United States. After 1945, it became the leader of the 
self-proclaimed “Free World,” helped finance the reconstruction of Western 
Europe and Japan, imposed its political and economic institutions and practices 
wherever it could and gained wider influence through aid, trade and invest-
ment. Extraordinary levels of investment at home in education and research, 
charitable support for the arts and the immigration of thousands of Europe’s 
leading scientists, artists and intellectuals made the U.S. the world’s leader in 
medicine, science, space exploration and the creative and performing arts. 
American popular culture became global in its appeal, leading some intellectu-
als to worry about Hollywood’s hegemony and debasement of real culture and 
others to celebrate it as a “soft power” resource (Horkheimer and Adorno 2001; 
Nye 1990). 
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Many historians, social scientists and international relations scholars con-
sider these outcomes overdetermined. Until quite recently, the conventional 
wisdom among historians was that Europe in 1914 was like dry kindling just 
waiting to be set aflame by a match (Afflerbach and Stevenson 2007). If the 
assassinations at Sarajevo had not triggered a continental war, some other 
provocation would have. International relations scholars have developed theo-
ries like power transition and offensive dominance to explain why a European 
war was all but inevitable. World War II appears at least as inevitable to many 
scholars given German dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Versailles and the 
aggressive goals and risk-taking propensity of Hitler, Mussolini and Japanese 
leaders. So does the Cold War in the light of the power vacuum in the heart of 
Europe at the end of World War II and the antagonistic social systems of the 
two victorious superpowers. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the So-
viet Union and the emergence of the U.S. as a “unipole” appear just as inevita-
ble to some observers. Students of the former Soviet Union, liberal theorists 
and proponents of globalization provide numerous reinforcing reasons why 
Soviet-style communism was doomed and American-style capitalist democracy 
the wave of the future (Clark forthcoming). 
The view that our world is the only possible world, or at least the most 
likely of all worlds, has multiple and reinforcing causes. There is the hindsight 
bias, by which we upgrade the probability of events once they have occurred 
and come to regard the past as overdetermined – but the future as highly con-
tingent (Fischoff 1975; Hawkins and Hastie 1990). The hindsight bias is rein-
forced by the very nature of the scholarly enterprise. Historians and social 
scientists make reputations for themselves by proposing new explanations or 
theories to account for major events like the fall of the Roman Empire, the 
industrial and French Revolutions, the World Wars and the Cold War. Con-
fronted by ever growing explanations for events of this kind, none of which can 
generally be dismissed out of hand, they appear massively overdetermined. The 
need for psychological closure also plays a role. In a set of surveys and ex-
periments (Lebow and Tetlock in Lebow 2009) Phil Tetlock conducted to 
probe how people understand the consequences of their beliefs. Those who see 
the world as to a great extent ordered and predictable display a need for psy-
chological closure and are hostile to suggestions of contingency – unless it 
helps to explain away an outcome inconsistent with their world views or pre-
ferred theories. Not surprisingly, many international relations scholars cluster 
towards the order and predictability end of the continuum. Whether they are 
socialized into understanding the world this way, or choose to become social 
scientists in part for this reason, the end result is the same: they are generally 
unwilling to recognize, or uncomfortable with the thought if they do, that im-
portant social outcomes could be the result of agency, chance or simply bad 
weather.  
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Discussions in the coffee lounge with thoughtful colleagues and feedback 
from faculty and graduate students at institutions where I gave seminars on my 
book (Lebow 2008) indicate considerable interest in counterfactuals as a re-
search tool but widespread confidence in the high probability, if not near inevi-
tability, of major twentieth century international outcomes, including those 
described in the paragraphs above. When I suggested that World War I might 
have been avoided if Franz Ferdinand and his wife had not been murdered by 
Serbian nationalists, I was frequently told that Europe was on the precipice of 
war and surely would have been tipped over the edge by some other concatena-
tion of events. Behind this claim lay the belief that World War I was the prod-
uct of systemic causes. When I raised the possibility of the Cuban missile crisis 
provoking a superpower war I met similar objections but a different argument. 
Policymakers are not entirely irrational, I was frequently told, and given the 
U.S. conventional advantage in the Caribbean and the overwhelming U.S. 
strategic nuclear advantage at the time the Soviet Union had no choice but to 
capitulate. This argument was made during the crisis by Maxwell Taylor, who 
insisted that if Khrushchev had other ideas more sober Soviet officials would 
soon assert their authority (Neustadt 1989). Not surprisingly, I found few col-
leagues convinced by my argument that had a European or World War in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century been averted, or if the Germans had 
won it, we might be living in a world in which authoritarian corporatism might 
have competed successfully against democratic, laissez-faire capitalism. These 
counterfactuals elicited a third generic argument: that the social world resem-
bles nature in its competitiveness and natural selection. Practices and institu-
tions that work efficiently will win out over those that are not. Democratic 
capitalism would ultimately have triumphed.  
Policymakers rarely act in response to explicit theories but commonly rely 
on more informal understandings of how the world works. They display the 
same belief in the retrospective near-inevitability of important historical out-
comes as their academic counterparts. In interviews with numerous American, 
Soviet and European politicians, diplomats and military officers who played 
prominent roles in the end of the Cold War, Richard Herrmann and I found that 
almost all of them believed that the Cold War had to end when and how it did. 
At the same time, these policymakers insisted on the contingency of develop-
ments critical to this outcome in which they played a major role. They told us 
how easily such developments (e.g., arms control, the unification of Germany) 
could have been forestalled or worked out differently if it had not been for their 
skill, relationships with their opposite numbers or ability to collaborate with 
them behind the backs of their respective governments. They seemed unaware 
of the contradiction between these two positions and struggled to reconcile 
them when pushed by us to do so (Herrmann and Lebow 2001). 
There is something wrong with this story. If major historical developments 
are so inevitable the pattern of events leading to them should not be so contin-
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gent. If events are overdetermined, the underlying conditions responsible for 
these events should have been apparent at the time to scholars and policymak-
ers alike, making them – although not their timing and specific expression – to 
some degree predictable. None of the events in question were self-evident at 
the time. In the decade prior to 1914 there was a general expectation among 
many military authorities and some, but by no means all, political leaders that a 
European war was likely. There was nevertheless remarkable optimism, within 
the diplomatic and business community, that mutual trade and investment had 
made war increasingly irrational and less likely. On the eve of the war books 
advancing both arguments were run-away best-sellers (Angell 1910; Bernhardi 
1912). European opinion was also divided on World War II, with many of 
those in power in France and Britain and the Soviet Union convinced that Hit-
ler had limited aims or could be bought off with territorial and other conces-
sions. For quite different reasons, Churchill and Roosevelt expected to be able 
to do business with the Soviet Union after World War II. Writing in 1959, John 
Herz reminds us that the advent of bipolarity was as unexpected as the atomic 
age, in part responsible for it (Herz 1959). Hardly anybody predicted the onset 
of the Cold War or its demise, let alone the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 
early decades of the Cold War, American foreign policy experts worried that 
the Soviet model would be more appealing to so-called Third World countries 
than liberal capitalism. In its latter decades, members of the U.S. national secu-
rity community thought it possible, if not likely, that the Soviet Union would 
pull ahead militarily and act more aggressively. Both expectations were wide of 
the mark. 
Single events are admittedly the most difficult kind to predict. However, our 
record is arguably no better when it comes to trends, patterns and macro out-
comes where prediction rests on the role of reason, social selection or some 
other alleged feature of the environment. A socialist world, which Marx 
thought would require revolution, and later revisionists hoped to bring about 
through the ballot box, is perhaps the best-known example. Socialists and con-
servatives alike assumed that education and economic development would 
make the world increasingly secular and that the power of religion would re-
cede into history. Premature triumphalism by neo-conservatives about liberal 
democracy and laissez-faire capitalism, which found voice in such best-sellers 
as Daniel Bell’s End of Ideology (1960) and Francis Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man (1992), also proved far off the mark. It is too early to 
pass judgment on predictions like those of Thomas Friedman (1999) that glob-
alization will usher in age of peaceful, liberal trading states – or, as its oppo-
nents insist, an era of vast disparities in wealth and crushing cultural uniform-
ity. I suspect that the future will once again defy prediction based on narrowly 
formulated logical arguments and linear projections.  
I learned this lesson early in my academic career; my first teaching post was 
at Brooklyn College in 1965, just as the social-political revolution of the 1960s 
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moved into high gear. The civil rights movement had been underway for some 
time and the anti-war movement was about to begin Woodstock was three 
years off, but flower power was in full bloom, bras were beginning to go the 
way of girdles and the air was redolent with the pungent aroma of pot and joss 
sticks. To my senior colleagues, these developments were as unanticipated as 
they were unpalatable. There are good reasons why they were caught off-guard. 
In retrospect, the transformation of the 1960s was a classic example of a non-
linear confluence. The postwar economic boom made rock and roll possible 
and both developments, along with access to automobiles and burgeoning 
college enrollments, generated a distinctive youth culture. The birth control 
pill, the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, all of which arrived hard 
on the heels of rock and roll, made that culture increasingly defiant. Systematic 
factors, including key international developments, were an important part of 
this story, but so were timing, chance and accident.  
Non-linear transformations admittedly stack the deck against prediction. 
Non-linear, as I use it, describes an outcome produced by one or more variables 
where the effect is additive or multiplicative. Any other interaction is non-
linear. This would include outcomes that involved step functions or phase 
transitions. The hard sciences routinely describe non-linear phenomena. Mak-
ing predictions about them becomes increasingly problematic when multiple 
variables are involved that have complex interactions. Some simple nonlinear 
systems can quickly become unpredictable when small variations in their inputs 
are introduced (Gleick 1987; Bak and Chen 1991). As so much of the social 
world is non-linear, fifty plus years of behavioral research and theory building 
have not led to any noticeable improvement in our ability to predict events. 
This is most evidence in the case of transformative events like the social-
political revolution of the 1960s, the end of the Cold War and the rise and 
growing political influence of fundamentalist religious groups.  
Radical skepticism about prediction of any but the most short-term out-
comes is fully warranted. This does not mean that we can throw our hands up 
in the face of uncertainty, contingency and unpredictability. In a complex soci-
ety, individuals, organizations and states require a high degree of confidence – 
even if it is misplaced – in the short-term future and a reasonable degree of 
confidence about the longer-term. In its absence they could not commit them-
selves to decisions, investments and policies. Like nudging the frame of a pin-
ball machine to influence the path of the ball, we cope with the dilemma of 
uncertainty by doing what we can to make our expectations of the future self-
fulfilling. We seek to control the social and physical worlds not only to make 
them more predictable but to reduce the likelihood of disruptive and damaging 
shocks (e.g., floods, epidemics, stock market crashes, foreign attacks). Our fall-
back strategy is denial. We convince ourselves that the future will more or less 
resemble the past, or deviate from it in predictable or manageable ways. We 
remain unreasonably confident in our beliefs despite the dramatic discontinui-
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ties of even the recent past – some of them caused by shocks we could not 
predict or control. The hindsight bias makes us exaggerate our estimates of the 
probability of events that actually occur while belief system defenses lead us to 
exaggerate the reasonableness our prior expectations that other outcomes 
would occur. Belief system defenses reinforce the hindsight bias and help to 
explain away predictive failures. 
There may be something more fundamental than either the hindsight bias or 
the need to believe in rationality that makes people – not just international 
relations scholars – reluctant to accept the important role of contingency in the 
social world. Prominent thinkers suggest that human beings harbor deep-seated 
fears about uncertainty and accordingly do their best to convince themselves 
that they can predict, even control, the future. David Hume (1999: Part III, 
Book 2, sect. 9) believed that “everything that is unexpected affrights us.” 
Martin Heidegger (1962, 18th edition) theorized at length about the anxiety 
generated by uncertainty and mortality. Terror Management Theory builds on 
this insight as do Anthony Giddens and the ontological security research pro-
gram (Giddens 1984; Greenberg et al 1994). In earlier times the universal hu-
man need to reduce anxiety about the future through some form of control 
found expression in efforts to propitiate the gods. Max Weber (1948) believed 
that modern people could no longer credibly invoke spirits and magic to control 
their environment, but prayer is alive and well in our society – and becoming 
more prevalent according to some surveys – despite the absence of any evi-
dence of its efficacy. The enduring belief in the power of prayer is undoubtedly 
another sign of people’s need to believe that they can influence the future, and 
all the more so when they live in uncertain and dangerous times.  
The behavioral revolution in social science might be understood as another 
expression of this primal need. Its bedrock assumption is that the social envi-
ronment is sufficiently ordered to be described by universal, or at least widely 
applicable, laws. Regularities in behavior make the past comprehensible and 
the future to some degree predictable. The appeal of deterrence during the Cold 
War – to theorists and policymakers alike – offers a telling example. It was 
psychologically and politically reassuring to think that the bogey of nuclear 
war could be kept at bay by the rational practice of deterrence against the So-
viet Union. Empirical support for deterrence was entirely counterfactual: the 
widespread belief that World War II and its horrors might have been prevented 
if only major European powers had stood firm against Hitler in 1936 or 1938. 
During the Cold War deterrence repeatedly failed (i.e., did not prevent chal-
lenges it was intended to) but was repeatedly confirmed tautologically. Political 
scientists interpreted encounters like the two Berlin and Taiwan Straits crises as 
deterrence successes, assuming that the Soviet Union or China would have 
attacked Berlin or Taiwan in the absence of American immediate deterrence 
(Allison 1971; George and Smoke 1974; Lebow and Stein 1990). Deterrence 
failures like the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba were explained away with 
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the counterfactual argument that these challenges could have been prevented if 
American presidents had practiced more forcibly. Evidence that came to light 
at the end of the Cold War would reveal that Soviet and Chinese leaders never 
doubted American resolve and that the forceful practice of deterrence by both 
sides – in the form of arms build-ups, forward deployments and bellicose rheto-
ric – repeatedly provoked behavior it was intended to prevent. The two Berlin 
crises and Cuba being cases in point (Chang 1990; Zhang 1992; Hopf 1994; 
Lebow and Stein 1994).  
In the United States – as distinct from Europe – faith in the science of poli-
tics remains high despite the inability of several generations of behavioral 
scientists to discover the kinds of laws that exist in the hard sciences. There is a 
widespread belief that the social world is governed by the same kind of regu-
larities as the physical world and that discovery of them will allow us to ex-
plain past developments and make reasonable predictions of a probabilistic 
nature. I do not deny the existence of regularities in social behavior; there is 
ample evidence for them – and for the power of constraints and opportunities to 
shape the behavior of actors. As Max Weber (1949) observed, these regulari-
ties, and the “laws” to which they allegedly give rise, are short-lived because of 
the reflective nature of human beings and the open-ended nature of the social 
world. Once regularities are known, actors take them into account, undermin-
ing their validity, as in the case of the famous “January effect” – an increase in 
the stock market following the release of annual reports (Thayer 1987). Alter-
natively, they are undercut by changes in the environment that alter the under-
lying conditions on which the regularity depends, as in the case of party identi-
fication to predict voting patterns in American elections (Almond 1977).  
The general reluctance of historians and social scientists to take non-
systematic factors seriously is adequate provocation to direct our attention to 
them. Are they really inconsequential for theory building or do they confound 
predictive theories in ways that are little understood or appreciated? Could key 
events like World War I have been untracked by credible minimal rewrites of 
history? What if Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated and there had been 
no European war in 1914? What if Hitler had died on the Western front during 
World War I instead of surviving, against all odds, almost four years of trench 
warfare? What if President Hindenburg had exercised his emergency powers 
more responsibly and Hitler had never come to power? What if Britain and 
France had prevented Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 
or had stood firm together with the Soviet Union at Munich in 1938? What if 
Kennedy had given in to hawkish demands for an air strike against the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba? What if Chernenko had not been succeeded by Gorbachev 
but another aging party hack intent on postponing any meaningful reform, 
rightly fearing its domestic and foreign consequences? 
Any of these outcomes were possible and some were arguably more likely 
than not. The list of cases can easily be extended. Counterfactual historians 
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have identified numerous “bifurcation points” where they contend history 
could easily have taken a radically different course. They run the gamut from 
military and political events like the ones noted above to more complex devel-
opments like the rise of religions and the industrial revolution (Crowley 1999; 
Tetlock, Lebow and Parker 2006). In Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and 
International Relations (Lebow 2009) I show how easily the assassinations of 
Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie could have been avoided and the many 
reasons to think that if there had been no continental war in 1914 Europe had at 
least an even chance to evolve peacefully over the next decade. A peaceful 
Europe would have been dominated by Germany, the economic and intellectual 
powerhouse of the continent. German would have rivaled English as the lan-
guage of business and science and its corporate model of capitalism would 
have provided an alternative to the more laissez-faire practices of Britain and 
the United States. A German dominated continent would have aborted the birth 
of the Soviet Union, and while Russia would have survived in some shrunken 
form, it is less likely that it would have become a superpower. Britain would 
probably have moved closer to the U.S. as a means of offsetting German influ-
ence. In a multi-polar world, international relations theory would have con-
cerned itself with a different set of problems.  
Consider a darker scenario arising from an American invasion of Cuba in 
1962. The Kennedy administration did not know that Soviet combat forces in 
Cuba were equipped with nuclear-tipped Luna ground-to-ground missiles and 
authorized to use them against an invasion force (Gribkov 1992; Lebow and 
Stein 1994, 294-95). If they had destroyed the American invasion fleet, the 
U.S. might have responded with a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. 
Even if escalation had stopped short of an all-out nuclear war, the Cold War 
would been put on a very different and more confrontational course. Détente 
would have been much less likely and so too the gradual evolution of the So-
viet Union away from its commitment to communism and the Cold War. Dam-
aged and humiliated by American nuclear strikes, the post-Khrushchev leader-
ship might have become more aggressive in its foreign policy. If the 
destruction of the American invasion fleet had led to a wider nuclear war there 
might not have been a Soviet Union in its aftermath. The United States and 
Western Europe would almost certainly have been the targets of nuclear weap-
ons in such an exchange, giving rise to a bleak and largely unpredictable future.  
Historians and social scientists in either of these worlds would have de-
scribed them as largely determined. In a Europe that avoided a continental war 
in 1914, or any time afterwards, liberalism would have been the dominant 
paradigm in the UK and the US, and socialism would have retained it appeal to 
intellectuals on the continent. Liberal international relations scholars would 
have developed theories about the restraining consequences of industrial devel-
opment, international trade, international law and trade union movements. 
Sociologists would have stressed the beneficial consequences of education, 
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widespread affluence, smaller families and longer life expectancy. If Germany 
had democratized, it seems likely that some variant of the democratic peace 
thesis would have emerged.  
If the Cuban missile crisis had led to war, conventional or nuclear, historians 
would have constructed a causal chain leading ineluctably to this outcome. It 
might begin with the Russian Revolution and the ideological cleavage it cre-
ated between East and West, and go on to include the mistrust and hostility 
created by the different but equally self-serving ways the Western democracies 
and the Soviet Union responded to the threat of Nazi Germany, the subsequent 
division of Europe, efforts by both superpowers to destabilize and penetrate the 
other’s sphere of influence, the spread of their competition to other parts of the 
world, nuclear arms racing and threats and finally, a crisis spiral (Berlin, Laos, 
Cuba) badly managed by insecure and risk-prone leaders (Kennedy and Khru-
shchev). Instead of explaining the “long peace,” historians would have com-
pared the run-up to World War III to the pre-1914 division of Europe into 
competing alliance systems and the series of crises that led to the July crisis 
and World War I. Realism would be the dominant paradigm in international 
relations, although its proponents would see no distinction between bi- and 
multi-polar systems. Counterfactual speculation that a superpower war could 
have been avoided and the Cold War brought to a peaceful end by the trans-
formation and de facto capitulation by the Soviet Union would be greeted with 
the same degree of incredulity that suggestions of a peaceful twentieth century 
Europe meet in ours.  
In Forbidden Fruit (Lebow 2009) I do not engage in counterfactual specula-
tion merely to make the case for the plausibility of alternate worlds. The con-
tingency of our world should be self-evident to any serious reader of history. I 
use counterfactuals to probe the limits of theory and to develop better means of 
understanding causation in a largely open-ended, non-linear highly contingent 
world. If regularities are short-lived, we have an equal interest in discovering 
them and their limitations and shelf lives. To date, social scientists have di-
rected their efforts to the discovery of regularities, not to the conditions and 
dynamics that degrade them. Those who believe in systematic or structural 
approaches to social science – terms I use interchangeably to refer to theorizing 
based on the discovery of regularities – ought to be equally interested in this 
latter question. I contend that counterfactual probing of transformations is a 
first and necessary step toward this goal. I examine two case studies that speak 
directly to these problems, as they probe contingency and the causes of interna-
tional transformations. In the conclusion I elaborate a method for better deter-
mining the contingency of outcomes. 
I also use counterfactuals to probe how policymakers, historians and social 
understand causation. To the extent that our understandings of the past are in 
thrall to cognitive and motivated biases, counterfactuals can help us recognize 
and overcome these impediments to greater openness and objectivity. My sur-
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veys and experiments reveal the power of beliefs to influence receptivity to 
counterfactuals but also the ability of counterfactuals to increase our estimates 
of contingency. These chapters also probe the relationship between belief sys-
tems and openness to counterfactuals that make and unmake history in ways 
the reinforce or undercut beliefs. 
Finally, I show how counterfactuals can be used to provide otherwise unat-
tainable perspectives on our world. We cannot easily step outside of this world 
and the beliefs we hold about it. Alternate worlds not only make this possible, 
they compel us to do so if we take them seriously. By providing distance from 
our world they are an indispensable means of evaluating it, empirically and 
normatively. They also provide insight into how we make sense of our world 
and why we are drawn to certain kinds of assumptions and theories. Such in-
sight is helpful, if not essential, to theory building and evaluation. Toward this 
end I use a short story and an analysis of two political novels, one of them 
counterfactual. In contrast to good social science, good literature tells stories 
that draw readers in, emotionally as well as intellectually. They provide macro-
level insights by placing readers in micro-level encounters, relationships and 
situations. Literature and its analysis accordingly have the potential to contrib-
ute to social science in important ways. This is a theme I began to explore in 
The Tragic Vision of Politics (Lebow 2003) where I argued, pace Nietzsche, 
that music, art and literature provide knowledge and experience that cannot be 
expressed in words and, by doing so, refresh our soul, heighten or provide new 
visions on that part of the world we seek to understand through language and 
concepts and the kind of knowledge they enable. The arts, humanities and the 
social science, while fundamentally different in their methods and often in the 
responses they invoke in us, should nevertheless be regarded as parallel pro-
jects leading greater understanding of ourselves and our world. In this volume, 
I try to substantiate this claim by showing how counterfactual literature offers 
insights into history and international relations that social science cannot and 
how these insights can further the task of history and social science. 
At the outset, I advance a novel and provocative epistemological claim: that 
the difference between so-called “factual” and counterfactual arguments is 
more one of degree than of kind. Both rest on assumptions about the world and 
how it works and connect hypothesized causes to outcomes by means of a 
chain of logic consistent with available evidence. In factual arguments there is 
rarely, if ever, a “smoking gun” that allows researchers to maintain with any 
degree of certainty that a particular cause was responsible for an outcome. The 
plausibility of factual and counterfactual arguments alike rests on the appeal of 
their assumptions, the tightness of the logic connecting cause to effect and the 
richness of the evidence that supports, or is at least consistent with, the steps in 
the logical chain. The fundamental similarity between the structure of counter-
factual and factual arguments means that many of the criteria for assessing the 
plausibility of one kind of argument are appropriate to the other. There are 
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nevertheless additional criteria for good counterfactual arguments, and here we 
must be careful to distinguish good from valid counterfactuals. The criteria for 
a good counterfactuals says a lot about their utility for purposes of analysis but 
nothing about their external validity. External validity can sometimes be tested 
on the basis of evidence. Like all propositions, counterfactuals can be falsified 
but never validated. 
The protocols for conducting counterfactual thought experiments depend on 
the social domain in which they are used. The most important feature of this 
domain is the extent to which it is amenable to statistical laws and generaliza-
tions. History generally lies outside this domain and accordingly requires a set 
of protocols that are different from those used for counterfactual experimenta-
tion in the sciences. I develop a set of protocols more appropriate to history and 
apply them to case studies of the origins of World War I and the end of the 
Cold War. In the last decade new evidence and interpretations require rethink-
ing our understanding of the causes of War and I. This evidence supports my 
contention that World War I was contingent in both its underlying and immedi-
ate causes. Historians have proposed a variety of underlying causes for World 
War I, from social Darwinism to nationalism, the alliance structure, offensive 
dominance and shifts in the balance of power. What made Europe ripe for war, 
I maintain, was not this multitude of alleged causes, but the nature of the inter-
actions among them. The First World War is best understood as a non-linear 
confluence of three largely independent chains of causation. They produced 
independent but more or less simultaneous gestalt shifts in Vienna and Berlin, 
and a slightly earlier one in Russia. Had the timing of the Austrian and German 
shifts been off by as little as two years, Austrian leaders would not have been 
so intent on destroying Serbia or German leaders might not have encouraged 
them to do so and the Russians would not have been willing to risk war to risk 
war in Serbia’s defense. 
The last part of my book turn to fiction because it provides the most compel-
ling and persuasive exploration of alternative worlds. Fact and fiction have 
always been intertwined in the human mind and share a common etymology in 
most Western languages. The idea of the “fact” as a description of the world 
independent of theory is an invention of the seventeenth century (Bacon 1994; 
Daston 1991; Dear 1995, 25). British empiricists of the latter half of the eight-
eenth century were drawn to history because they understood the present to be 
constructed on the understanding of the past. They sought rules for gathering 
and evaluating facts, became champions of quantitative data and tried to de-
velop more transparent modes of presentation. David Hume rejected interpreta-
tions that were not based on particulars that could be observed and brought his 
understanding of induction to the study of history. He effectively debunked the 
idea that history told a story about a decline from a past golden age. His in-
volvement with history nevertheless led him to conclude that it is functionally 
indistinguishable from novels and epic poetry because, like these forms, it is 
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only made meaningful by fictional emplotment; a mere recital of past events 
being nothing more than a chronicle. For Hume, history, freed of its Christian 
and mythical roots, is the proper paradigm of human understanding because it 
connects our consciousness with what lies outside of it. It is a “moral science” 
because the conventions that govern human behavior are the unintended result 
of individuals’ engagement with one another and the world. History helps to 
clarify these conventions and make them more meaningful by describing their 
emergence and evolution (Hume 1995; Livingston 1984, chs. 5 and 8). Many 
eighteenth century historical works contain features that we associate with the 
novel because they seek to generate knowledge through the vehicle of conver-
sation with the reader and elicit identification with the author who appears as 
the principal “character” of his or her work (McKeon 1987; Siskin 1997; 
Poovey 1998, 15). 
Thanks to Hume and his continental counterparts, by the mid-nineteenth 
century history had replaced poetry as the principal source of knowledge and 
wisdom about humanity. Poetry was subsumed under the rubric of fiction, 
which by now had emerged as a generic category. This reversal of the relative 
standing of history and poetry, or more broadly speaking, of fact and fiction, 
was never fully accepted by creative artists and some philosophers. Modernist 
writers, among them Joyce, Pound and Eliot, insisted that no era had a monop-
oly on experience, understanding and wisdom and that recovery of the past was 
essential to human fulfillment. They embraced poetry as the appropriate vehi-
cle toward this end (Longenbach 1978, ch. 10). Nietzsche (1962) went a step 
further and insisted that art and music spoke a truth that went beyond words 
and had the potential to free people from the tyranny of logic. Twentieth cen-
tury writers, whether or not they engage history, are heirs to this tradition. 
Many of their readers have come to accept fiction as a vehicle for stretching 
and challenging their consciousness and understanding of the world in ways 
history does not (Grossmann 1978). 
Historical counterfactuals have the potential to build bridges between his-
tory and fiction. They may be used to interrogate and offer critical perspectives 
on history and social science or their intellectual foundations. This is the 
avowed goal of the short story that constitutes chapter seven of Forbidden 
Fruit. It plays psycho-logic off against the laws of statistical inference to dem-
onstrate the inherently conservative bias of the latter with respect to alternative 
worlds. My story takes place in an imaginary world in which Mozart has lived 
to the age of sixty-five and as a result, neither world war nor the Holocaust 
occurred. My heroine and her partner try to imagine what the world would have 
been be like if Mozart had died at age thirty-five, her partner’s age. The alter-
native world my characters invoke is a pale version of our twentieth century 
world with all its unspeakable the horrors, and is summarily dismissed by an 
imaginary critic who demonstrates its political and statistical improbability. My 
heroine concludes with a biting if humorous rejoinder. My story does double 
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duty as a “long-shot” counterfactual and experimental instrument, which I use 
earlier in the book as part of my effort to understand how historians and inter-
national relations scholars understand causation. 
I also examine more serious fiction in the form of two best-selling novels by 
comparing Sinclair Lewis’ It Can’t Happen Here (1935) with Philip Roth’s 
The Plot Against America (2004). The former looks ahead to the 1936 presi-
dential election and the victory of the fictional fascist Senator Buzz Windrip 
over Franklin Roosevelt. The latter looks back to the 1940 presidential election 
to imagine Roosevelt’s defeat by aviator Charles A. Lindbergh, in thrall to the 
Nazis, and whose administration is isolationist abroad and anti-Semitic at 
home. Strictly speaking, these novels only peripherally engage international 
relations. Novels about alternate worlds – especially those set in the past – are 
nevertheless the ultimate form of counterfactual unpacking. They speak to a 
fundamental goal of my book: exploring the ways in which fact and fiction 
work together to create a powerful impression on readers. They suggest that the 
binary between fact and fiction is to a great extent artificial and can creatively 
and usefully be bridged for analytical as well as artistic purposes. This under-
standing, I argue in the conclusion, has important implications for the study and 
practice of international relations. 
Of the two novels only The Plot Against America qualifies as counterfactual 
in that it remakes the past. Counterfactual fiction almost invariably uses an 
antecedent – some rewrite of history – to produce a consequent in the form of 
an altered present. The antecedent is intended to be amplifying in its effects, 
taking history further away from the world we know. Roth changes history by 
changing the outcome of the 1940 election and making its winner subject to 
blackmail by Hitler, creating a sharp divergence from the history we know. 
Toward the end of the novel he introduces a deus ex machina to return history 
to its actual course once the alternate world he creates has served its purposes. 
Critics find his second order counterfactual unconvincing, but its credibility, I 
contend, is beside the point. Roth is a cut above other practitioners of the coun-
terfactual novel genre, and not only by virtue of the quality of his writing. He is 
self-conscious and reflective about his use of history and counter-history. There 
is much to learn from Roth about the ways in which counterfactual history can 
be used to offset inherent weaknesses of the genre of history and become an 
effective rhetorical vehicle for advancing cultural or political projects. More 
importantly for our purposes, his novel drives home just how much our emo-
tional and intellectual anchors are the product of our circumstances, circum-
stances that we generally take for granted. Even if they are not as contingent as 
The Plot Against America appears to suggest, they are still parochial, not uni-
versal, and certainly not pre-ordained. This realization has important conse-
quences for our understanding of theory in the social sciences. 
My conclusion builds on the findings of the earlier chapters to make more 
general arguments about the nature of causation and the relationship between 
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fact and fiction and factual and counterfactual. Drawing on World War I and 
the Cold War cases, it expands upon the procedure outlined earlier in Forbid-
den Fruit for determining the relative weight of systematic and non-systematic 
causes in individual cases. It develops a strategy for using counterfactuals to 
explore non-linear causation. It reviews the findings of my two experimental 
studies and their implications for international relations theory and the ability 
of scholars to meet the cognitive and ethical requirements Weber associates 
with good theory. A final section attempts to build bridges between literature 
and social science. It does so by revisiting the binary of fact and fiction. I argue 
that we should recognize the tensions and fuzziness that surround this binary 
and exploit them for creative ends, as do social scientists who conduct counter-
factual research and novelists who write counterfactual fiction. Until now, 
these projects, often on parallel tracks, have had no switches connecting them. 
My book aspires to remedy this situation to the benefit, I believe, of both com-
munities. 
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